

ἐϋπλων to ὀπλων.¹³ Secondly, the new reading has the advantage of maintaining the striking antithesis between the old, trustworthy *kyrbeis* and the new, suspicious *stelai*,¹⁴ and it further remains consonant with Lysias' later accusations against Nicomachus for adding excessively to the laws beyond what the law-makers had decided upon (in which the word *πλείω* is used three times). Thus a set of phantom *stelai* can finally be forgotten.¹⁵

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¹³ Andronicus Callistus used MS X as the sole exemplar for his copy (*Codex Ambrosianus* H52 sup. (gr. 436) [=MS Am₄]) while his friend Joannes Rhosus used Callistus' copy for his own (*Codex Laurentianus* 57.4 [=MS C]), as shown by Sosower (n. 12), 59–62 (though in his stemma at xvii Am₁ is mistakenly placed above C instead of Am₄). The reading in MS C is ὀπλων but I have been unable to discover what the reading is in MS Am₄.

¹⁴ Rhodes (n. 1), 95 notes that with Taylor's reading Lysias 'shifts *stelai* to the other scale of the balance' but does not provide a satisfactory explanation for this.

¹⁵ I would like to thank Philip Harding for bringing the issues involved here to my attention, for encouraging me to publish my thoughts on them, and for looking over a draft of this paper.

PLATO, *LAWS* 10, 905E3: ΕΝΤΕΛΕΧΩΣ OR ΕΝΔΕΛΕΧΩΣ

The bulk of *Laws* 10 is devoted to refuting what Plato considers three impious positions: atheism, deism (the gods exist, but do not care about humans), and traditional theism (the gods exist, and can be bribed through prayer and gifts).

Having completed his refutation of deism at 905D2, Plato sets his sights on traditional theism, beginning: 'In what way would they [the gods] come to be appeased by us, if they could be? And what or what sort would they be?' (905D8–E2). But it is the line that immediately follows this passage that interests me here. At 905E2–3, Plato continues (in the words of the manuscripts):

ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀναγκαῖόν ποῦ γίγνεσθαι τοὺς γε διοικήσοντας τὸν ἅπαντα ἐντελεχῶς οὐρανόν.

Presumably they [the gods] will necessarily be rulers, since they manage the entire heavens perfectly [ἐντελεχῶς].

The fifth-century A.D. anthologist Stobaeus, however, has ἐνδελεχῶς (perpetually) in place of ἐντελεχῶς (*Flor.* 1.3.55). Of recent editors, Burnet and England follow the manuscripts, while Bury and Diès follow Stobaeus.¹ Among English translators of the *Laws*, only Taylor accepts the reading of the manuscripts: 'Governors, to be sure, they must be supposed to be, if they are to have *effective* control of the whole universe.' (As he often does, Taylor seems here to be following a suggestion of

¹ J. Burnet, *Platonis opera* 5 (Oxford, 1907); E. B. England, *The Laws of Plato* (2 vols, Manchester, 1921); R. Bury, *Plato: The Laws* (2 vols, Cambridge, MA, 1926); A. Diès, *Platon: Les Lois, Livres VII–X* (Paris, 1956, 1994²).

England, who takes ἐντελεχῶς to mean ‘effectively.’²) Most English translations, however, go with the other reading. I present four of them, in chronological order.

JOWETT: ‘Must they not be at least rulers who have to order *unceasingly* the whole heaven?’

BURY: ‘Necessarily they must be rulers, if they are to be in *continual* control of the whole heaven.’

SAUNDERS: ‘Well, if they are going to have to run the entire universe *for ever*, presumably they’ll have to be rulers.’

PANGLE: ‘Presumably they must necessarily be rulers, since they manage the entire heaven *perpetually*.’³

Diès is the standard text of Plato’s *Laws*; Saunders’s is the most widely available English translation; Pangle’s has the reputation of being the English translation most faithful to the Greek; and all three follow Stobaeus over the manuscripts—though with virtually no discussion or argumentation in support of this departure from the manuscripts.

In this note, I weigh the evidence for both readings, and conclude that roughly equally strong cases can be made for each of them. But although the issue is unresolved, I think it is nevertheless worthy of comment.

The case for the manuscript reading (ἐντελεχῶς)

I believe that examining the passage in the context of the philosophical argumentation in *Laws* 10—which I undertake to do in this section—supports the manuscript reading.

Note first that neither word—ἐντελεχῶς or ἐνδελεχῶς—is necessary for the point Plato is making: to show that the gods must be rulers. They must be rulers, he argues, because they manage the entire heavens. Doing so perfectly and doing so perpetually would each make them more impressive rulers, but neither quality is necessary for the logical move Plato makes. Moreover, it seems clear from the rest of *Laws* 10 that Plato in some sense subscribes to the content of both readings: that is, the gods manage the heavens perpetually (a point which is not emphasized, but see 892A2–B2, 895B3–7, 896A5–D3, 903B7–C5, 905B1–7) and they do so perfectly (more on this shortly).

The line that concerns us comes at the beginning of Plato’s response to the traditional theist, which follows (and is connected to) his response to the deist. This provides the key, because I believe that ἐντελεχῶς in our line makes the most sense, and (if it is the correct reading) is most likely a remnant or reminder of a central point that Plato made *contra* the deist.

In his response to the deist (at 899D4–905D2), a lot of emphasis is put on the fact, as Plato sees it, that the gods are concerned about the *entire* universe—every part of it, however small. The basic argument is that the gods are capable of caring for small matters (including human beings) as well as great ones (for example, celestial objects), so the only reasons there could be for the gods neglecting humans are ignorance and a lack of virtue; but it is impossible for the gods to be ignorant or vicious; therefore, the gods care for human beings. Here are some representative passages:

² A. E. Taylor, *Plato: The Laws* (London, 1934); England (n. 1), 2.499.

³ B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato* 4 (Oxford, 1871); Bury (n. 1); T. J. Saunders, *Plato: The Laws* (London, 1970); T. L. Pangle, *The Laws of Plato* (Chicago, 1980). Diès (n. 1) translates ἐνδελεχῶς ‘sans arrêt’.

the gods care for small matters no less than the especially big matters (900C8–9)

being good at least with respect to every excellence, they [the gods] possess as most proper to them the care of all things (900D1–3)

the gods know and see and hear everything, and nothing of which there are perceptions and knowledge can escape them (901D2–5)

they are capable of everything that is possible to mortals and immortals (901D8–9)

all mortal animals are property of the gods, as are the entire heavens (902B8–9)

let someone claim that these are either small or great to the gods; for in neither case would it befit our owners to neglect us, since they are most solicitous and best (902B11–C3)

If some whole [body] is assigned to a doctor to treat, and he wants and is able to care for the big parts, but neglects the small, will the whole [patient] ever fare well for him? (902D2–5)

So let us never suppose that the god is inferior to mortal craftsmen, who, the better they are, the more exactly and more perfectly [τελεώτερα] they accomplish, with one art, the small and the large aspects of the work that is proper to them; nor that the god, who is very wise, and willing and able to care, will not at all supervise what, being small, is easily supervised, but will supervise the large things, just like some idle or cowardly person, who is lazy in the face of toil. (902E5–903A3)

Everything is put together with a view to the preservation and excellence of the whole, by the one who cares for everything, and each part, to the extent that it can, experiences and does what is fitting. Rulers have been set up over the experience and activity of each of these [parts], to the smallest detail, always [ἀεί], and they [the rulers] have achieved perfection [τέλος] to the remotest fraction. (903B4–C1)

their contribution ever [ποτέ] helps the whole. (905B7)

Shortly after this last passage, we arrive at 905E2–3 and the beginning of Plato's refutation of traditional theism, and—if the manuscript reading is correct—the claim that the gods 'manage the entire heavens perfectly' (ἐντελεχῶς).

Note that the important point made again and again in this series of texts against deism is the completeness or thoroughness of the gods' concern for everything in the universe, however small, and that their concern for everything is with a view to what is best for the whole. And when an analogy to rulers is employed—at 903B4–C1—the emphasis, again, is on the completeness or perfection of the rulers' concern for the matters which they supervise. Further note that although Plato believes that the gods have this concern for everything perpetually—since the gods have always existed and performed this function—this point is merely mentioned (ἀεί 'always' at 903B9; ποτέ 'ever' at 905B7); it is certainly not emphasized.

The case for Stobaeus' reading (ἐνδελεχῶς)

Given that taking the line in the context of the argument of *Laws* 10 supports the manuscript reading, why do so many editors and translators favour the reading of Stobaeus? They do so for philological, not philosophical, reasons.

The first, and perhaps strongest, support of this kind is the fact that the word ἐντελεχῶς exists nowhere else, in any Greek text. So if it is not a *falsa lectio* (as LSJ claims), it is a hapax legomenon.⁴ Of course, this does not rule out ἐντελεχῶς—after

⁴ Reporting on ἐντελεχής, LSJ states: 'only as a f.l. for ἐνδ- . . . ; and so Adv. -ῶς Pl. *Lg.* 905e.' (As I mention below, at 336^a15 of Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione*, MS E has ἐντελεχῶς; but it is unlikely that this is the correct reading.)

all, some hapax legomena are genuine—but it is a strong argument against it, since a more common alternative is readily available. Further, aside from the adverbial form *ἐντελεχώς*, *ἐντελεχ-* words appear nowhere (else) in the Platonic corpus, while *ἐνδελεχ-* words, though not common, appear at least four times, once in the *Laws* itself, and in three cases in the adverbial form *ἐνδελεχῶς*:

1. *Resp.* 539D8: *ἐνδελεχῶς* (discussing the devotion to argument).
2. *Tim.* 43C8: *ἐνδελεχῶς* (discussing the relationship between body and soul).
3. *Tim.* 58C4: *ἐνδελεχῶς* (discussing the nature of the elements).
4. *Leg.* 718A1: *ἐνδελεχῇ* (discussing a memorial to one's parents).⁵

The reason for the absence of *ἐντελεχ-* words—it has been argued—is that *ἐντελεχες* and related words (unlike *ἐνδελεχῶς* and words related to it) are not standard Greek, but are based on a technical philosophical term coined by Aristotle. Here is Festugière (in a passage quoted by Diès): 'la forme *ἐντελέχεια* doit avoir *a priori* le pas sur *ἐντελΟχεια*, car . . . elle est grecque et normalement continuée sur l'adjectif (cf. *δολιχός*) alors qu'*ἐντελέχεια* est un vocable purement technique, créé artificiellement par Aristote.'⁶

But however much Aristotle came to differ philosophically from Plato, it is not unreasonable to think, given the connection between them and the likelihood that Aristotle was around when Plato was writing the *Laws*, that the term *ἐντελέχεια* (and even *ἐντελεχῶς*)—whether 'créé artificiellement par Aristote' or by Plato (or by someone else entirely)—was available to Plato when he wrote the *Laws*. The absence of *ἐντελεχ-* words in the rest of Plato's corpus certainly gives some weight to Stobaeus' reading, but it is not conclusive. (And note that in *Laws* 10, and nowhere else, Plato uses two rare philosophical terms that he probably coined himself: *πρωτουργοί* and *δευτερουργοί*, which he uses to distinguish two kinds of motion [897A4–5].)

Another consideration that lends support to *ἐνδελεχῶς* is the ancient tradition of authors and copyists confusing *ἐντελεχ-* and *ἐνδελεχ-* words. As we shall see, the history of this textual confusion undercuts any presumption of innocence we may think of giving the manuscript reading, and casts suspicion on *ἐντελεχ-* words, since a review of that history suggests that the confusion tended to cause a change *from* *ἐνδελεχ-* words *to* *ἐντελεχ-* words.

Especially significant are confusions relatively close in time to the end of Plato's life, when he wrote the *Laws*. Consider two passages from *De generatione et corruptione* 2.10, in which Aristotle discusses the efficient cause of generation and corruption. Much of the discussion concerns locomotion being eternal and generation continual or perpetual:

Next, since it has been proved that movement by way of locomotion is eternal [*ἀίδιος*], generation also . . . must take place continuously [*συνεχῶς*]; for locomotion will produce generation perpetually [*ἐνδελεχῶς*] by bringing near and taking away the generator [i.e. the sun].
(336^a15–18)⁷

⁵ For an instance of *ἐνδελεχῶς* used before Plato and in a context somewhat similar to that of *Laws* 10, see Critias 88 B 19.5 DK.

⁶ A.-J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* 3. *Les Doctrines de l'âme* (Paris, 1953), 188, n. 6. See Diès (n. 1), 176, n. 2.

⁷ Here and in the next passage, I have used the translation (with revision) of C. J. F. Williams, *Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione* (Oxford, 1982).

The manuscripts FHJL have ἐνδελεχῶς, whereas E has ἐντελεχῶς. Editors (for example, Bekker, Joachim, Mugler) have gone with ἐνδελεχῶς, which is preferable (though ἐντελεχῶς is not impossible). A bit later, Aristotle attempts to demonstrate why generation and corruption will always (ἀεί) be continuous (συνεχής): since not all things that exist can exist in the fullest way possible—the way god exists—nature provides them with the next best thing: ‘god has filled up the whole [i.e. the universe] in the remaining way, by making generation perpetual [ἐνδελεχῆ]’ (336^b25–34). Here, FHJL have ἐνδελεχῆ and E has ἐντελεχῆ. But among the editors, whereas Joachim and Mugler support the former, Bekker thinks ἐντελεχῆ is correct. Again, ἐντελεχῆ seems less likely, but it could work.

In *Tusculan Disputations* 1.10.22, Cicero says that Aristotle (probably in his early *On Philosophy*) ‘applies to the actual soul [*ipsum animum*] a new term, ἐνδελέχεια, descriptive of a sort of uninterrupted and perpetual movement’.⁸ There is scholarly debate over whether Cicero incorrectly used ἐνδελέχεια instead of ἐντελέχεια.⁹

Pamela Huby reports a similar confusion:

Arius Didymus (fr. phys. Diels) says that Aristotle called it (τό εἶδος) ἐντελέχεια (ἐνδελέχεια) either because it existed continuously (ἐνδελεχῶς ὑπάρχειν), or because ‘it makes each of what shares in it perfect (τέλειον)’ which involves a muddle between ἐντελέχεια and ἐνδελέχεια.¹⁰

Next, consider this report on Aristotle from Iamblichus’s *On the Soul* (in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 1.49.32): ‘Some of the Aristotelians suppose that the soul is a body made of ether; others define it—in accordance with the essential nature of the divine body—as a perfection [τελειότητα], which Aristotle calls “perpetual [motion]” [ἐνδελέχειαν].’¹¹ Again, some have argued that ἐνδελέχειαν is a mistake and should be replaced by ἐντελέχειαν.¹²

My purpose here is not to offer solutions to any of these textual problems, but to illustrate part of the history of the confusion over ἐντελεχ- and ἐνδελεχ- words,¹³ and to point out what should come as no surprise: that the confusion seems to be especially acute when the context is philosophical or theological discussions about eternity and perfection—precisely the context of *Laws* 10, 905E3. I think the confusion between ἐντελεχ- and ἐνδελεχ- words shows only that there is a definite possibility that the original was ἐνδελεχῶς rather than ἐντελεχῶς—and on this issue we can speak only of possibilities or probabilities.

But as a last word on this tradition of textual confusion, consider Lucian, the second-century A.D. satirist, who in his *Iudicium vocalium* has Sigma take Tau to court and declare: ‘Listen, vowels of the jury, to Delta, who says: he [Tau] robbed me of ἐνδελέχειαν, wanting it to be called ἐντελέχειαν against all the laws’ (10).¹⁴ The complaint suggests that ἐντελέχειαν has been improperly replacing ἐνδελέχειαν, and

⁸ Translation from J. E. King, *Cicero: Tusculan Disputations* (Cambridge, MA, 1927).

⁹ See King (n. 8), 28, n. 1, and Pamela Huby, *Theophrastus of Ephesus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, commentary, 4. *Psychology* (Texts 265–327) (Leiden, 1999), 18–19. LSJ (s.v. ἐντελέχεια) writes: ‘confused with ἐνδελέχεια (q.v.) by Cic. *Tusc.* 1.10.22’.

¹⁰ Huby (n. 9), 19, n. 32. I have used the Greek in place of Huby’s transliteration.

¹¹ I have relied on the text and (with revisions) the translation from W. W. Fortenbaugh et al., *Theophrastus of Ephesus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* 2 (Leiden, 1992), fr. 269.

¹² See the discussion of this passage in Huby (n. 9), 18–20.

¹³ See also Theophr. *Caus. pl.* 5.1.10: ἐνδελεχές (ἐντελεχές). LSJ writes (s.v. ἐνδελέχεια) ‘Freq. confused with ἐντελεχής (q.v.)’ and (s.v. ἐνδελεχής) ‘Freq. confused with ἐντελεχής in codd.’

¹⁴ Translation is based on that of A. M. Harmon, *Lucian* 1 (Cambridge, MA, 1913).

not the other way around, which supports ἐνδελεχῶς over ἐντελεχῶς at *Laws* 10, 905E3. And the support would be even stronger if ‘against all the laws’ (παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους) was an allusion to Plato’s *Laws*, which I suppose is just possible.

The strength of the philological case for ἐνδελεχῶς should cause us to give serious consideration to accepting the reading of Stobaeus over that of the manuscripts, and explains why so many editors and translators have done so.

A stalemate

We have reached a stalemate. Taken in its philosophical context, the manuscript reading ἐντελεχῶς—‘perfectly’, in the sense of completely and with a view to the best—is more natural than ἐνδελεχῶς. But there are some excellent philological reasons for thinking that Stobaeus’ reading is correct—especially the fact that ἐντελεχῶς appears nowhere (else) in *any* author. I would not go to the stake to defend either reading; but if I had to choose, I would (without much confidence) go with the manuscripts and ἐντελεχῶς: the gods ‘manage the entire heavens perfectly’—that is, they neglect nothing, and see to what is best for everything as a whole.¹⁵

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¹⁵ I should like to thank an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

THE MYSTERIOUS ‘CYRENEANS’ IN [DEMOSTHENES] 59.9*

The transmitted text at the end of §9 of [Demosthenes] 59, (*Apollodorus*) *Against Neaera*, presents a scholarly puzzle of long standing. The speaker—Theomnestus in this introductory section of the speech (§§1–15)—claims that Stephanus, Neaera’s putative husband, had tried to have Apollodorus exiled:

ἐπενέγκας γὰρ αὐτῷ αἰτίαν ψευδῇ ὥς Ἀφίδναζέ ποτε ἀφικόμενος ἐπὶ δραπετὴν αὐτοῦ ζητῶν πατάξειε γυναῖκα καὶ ἐκ τῆς πληγῆς τελευτήσειεν ἢ ἄνθρωπος, παρασκευασάμενος ἀνθρώπους δούλους καὶ κατασκευάσας ὥς Κυρηναῖοι εἴησαν, προεῖπεν αὐτῷ ἐπὶ Παλλαδίῳ φόνου.

For he brought a false accusation against him that once, when he had gone to Aphidna in search of a runaway slave of his, he struck a woman and the person died from the blow; (Stephanus), suborning slave persons and representing them as Cyreneans, summonsed him for homicide at the Palladium.

The most recent student of the speech, Debra Hamel, has this to say on the point: ‘[w]e cannot know why Stephanos disguised his witnesses as Kyreneans. Stephanos may not have wanted the court to know that the witnesses he was presenting—who were perhaps manifestly non-Greek—were slaves. But why Kyrene was selected as

* A first draft of what follows profited from the reactions of Chris Carey, Debra Hamel, Kostas Kapparis, Douglas MacDowell, Cynthia Patterson, and Lene Rubinstein (most of whose